This paper assesses the importance of adverse health shocks as triggers of bankruptcy filings. We view car crashes as a proxy for health shocks and draw on a large sample of police crash reports linked to hospital admission records and bankruptcy case files. We report two findings: (i) there is a strong positive correlation between an individual's preshock financial condition and his or her likelihood of su↵ering a health shock, an example of behavioral consistency; and (ii) after accounting for this simultaneity, we are unable to identify a causal e↵ect of health shocks on bankruptcy filing rates. These findings emphasize the importance of risk heterogeneity in determining financial fragility, raise questions about prior studies of "medical bankruptcy," and point to important challenges in identifying the triggers of consumer bankruptcy. JEL Codes: D12, D14, K35.
Introduction
A large literature assesses household financial fragility by examining responses to unexpected shocks such as job loss, marital divorce, health problems, and natural disasters.
If households are not fully insured through financial markets or self-insurance, these shocks can generate financial distress, as measured by consumer defaults or bankruptcy filings. The sensitivity of households to shocks of various magnitudes is relevant both to academic studies of risk-sharing as well as to policy debates about the design of public insurance programs and the administration of debt relief laws.
Health problems in particular are an important source of individual financial risk and are commonly thought to be an important driver of consumer bankruptcy filings. President Obama and members of Congress cited the phenomenon of "medical bankruptcy"bankruptcy filings triggered by health care costs-in speeches advocating the recent health care reform legislation (Jacoby and Holman 2010) . Members of Congress have also proposed legislation that would make the Bankruptcy Code more generous for consumers with significant health-related debts (an example is the "Medical Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2009").
These public policy arguments find support in several well-known studies, including Himmelstein et al. (2005 Himmelstein et al. ( , 2010 , which examined bankruptcy files and found substantial medical bills (around $5,000) in over half of the cases.
Although these studies have played an important role in academic and policy debates, they do not show whether adverse health conditions cause bankruptcy filings in the sense that households would not have filed for bankruptcy if these conditions had not occurred (or were better insured against). An alternative hypothesis is that long-term background characteristics, such as personal financial management or underlying risk preferences, are the fundamental drivers of financial distress and bankruptcy filing rates. Background personal characteristics could simultaneously elevate the probability of developing health conditions and experiencing financial default. This potentially complex relationship between personal health and financial management presents a fundamental challenge to properly identifying the causal impact of health shocks on financial distress. Our paper makes two contributions. First, we confirm empirically that common variables a↵ect both financial and bodily health. We show this by studying car crashes, which we view as a type of shock that exposes households to health problems. We draw on a unique panel dataset that links (i) police reports from all car crashes in Utah during 1992 through 2005 to (ii) hospital admission records and (iii) bankruptcy case files that allow us to measure bankruptcy filing rates before and after crashes. Using these data, we find that background driver characteristics are important determinants of both the probability of experiencing a crash and the probability of filing for bankruptcy. In particular, drivers who sustained severe accidents had substantially higher bankruptcy filing rates-both before and after the crashes-relative to drivers who experienced only minor accidents. This di↵erence persists even when we focus only on drivers who were judged by the police to be "not at fault" for their accidents.
These findings strongly indicate that unobservable driver characteristics elevate both the risk of a severe accident and the probability of a bankruptcy filing-a type of behavioral consistency-and suggest a possible bias in prior studies that fail to account for the joint determination of household shocks and financial distress.
We address this bias using a new di↵erence-in-di↵erence (DD) strategy that exploits the panel construction of our data. We construct two groups of drivers: a treatment group that experienced crashes in period t, and an observationally similar control group that experienced equally severe crashes in period t + n. We compare the treatment and control groups during the n 1 periods (quarters or years) before and after period t. During this period, only drivers in the treatment group experienced a crash. We compare the bankruptcy filing rates of treatment and control group drivers before and after period t to estimate the causal e↵ect of this type of health shock on bankruptcy filing rates. This empirical strategy deals with secular time trends in bankruptcy filing rates, which are a strong feature of our data.
More importantly, by conditioning on crash severity, this strategy allows for the possibility that treatment and control group drivers share a common (unobservable) characteristic that jointly determines bankruptcy filing rates and the propensity to experience a crash. By conditioning on this unobservable heterogeneity across drivers, we can test the causal e↵ect of a health shock among drivers with similar background financial characteristics. 1
Our empirical strategy assumes that treatment and control group drivers are comparable during the years immediately before and after the treatment date. It also assumes that the timing of a crash, conditional on its severity, is independent of the bankruptcy filing rate.
We present evidence consistent with both assumptions.
The second contribution of our paper is that, after accounting for the joint determination of accident risk and financial risk, we find no evidence that the health shocks investigated here are a cause of bankruptcy filings. Among drivers with an average hospital charge around $13,000 (measured in year 2012 dollars), we observe no increase in the probability of a bankruptcy filing, relative to the control group, through the first three years following the crash. This finding persists when we subset on drivers who are less likely to be fully insured (at-fault drivers, uninsured drivers, and drivers who incurred health care costs substantially in excess of state-mandated insurance levels) and drivers who are plausibly more financially fragile (drivers between ages 35 and 45, those living in lower-income zip codes, and those driving with children, who may also have been injured).
These findings indicate that one of the most commonly observed health shocksautomobile crashes-is not an important driver of bankruptcy filings. One interpretation is that the typical driver (at least in Utah) is fully insured against the shocks arising from automobile crashes measured at di↵erent magnitudes, at least with respect to filing for bankruptcy. This interpretation is interesting given several facts about insurance markets. First, although not-at-fault drivers can recover some of the costs of crashes-which include bodily harm, property damage, and wage loss-by drawing on the legally mandated personal liability insurance of at-fault drivers, not all at-fault drivers cary su cient insurance. In 2007, eight percent of Utah drivers lacked any auto insurance (Insurance Research Council 2009) . Second, the at-fault drivers must draw on other forms of insurance to cover both their own injuries as well as the injuries of the not at-fault-driver. As noted above, at-fault drivers may not hold liability insurance to cover the costs of the other driver. Additionally, a substantial fraction of at-fault drivers do not carry health insurance to cover all medical expenses arising from 1 A similar empirical strategy is employed by Hilger (2013) , who uses variation in the time of treatment, conditional upon treatment, as the principal source of variation. an automobile crash. In 2009, seventeen percent of adult Utahns (aged 19 to 64) had no health insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts 2010) . Although Utah requires drivers to carry a minimum of $3,000 in "personal injury protection" insurance to cover medical costs from crashes, our findings persist when we focus on severe crashes in which the average medical charge was about $16,000. It is also likely that a substantial fraction of at-fault drivers do not carry personal automobile collision insurance su cient to cover the costs of their own property damage. Despite the incomplete nature of formal insurance coverage-particularly among at-fault drivers-we conclude that a combination of formal and informal insurance mechanisms are su cient to prevent a consumer bankruptcy filing after shocks of the magnitudes investigated in our paper.
Related Literature. Our paper intersects three literatures. The first focuses on the determinants of consumer bankruptcy. A number of papers have emphasized the financial fragility of households and the link between adverse events and bankruptcy filing rates. In an important line of studies, Himmelstein, et al. (2010 Himmelstein, et al. ( , 2005 survey bankruptcy filers and elicit information about medical expenditures prior to the bankruptcy filings, reporting in their most recent work that illness or medical bills contributed to at least sixty-two percent of the bankruptcies. Similar findings-that medical expenditures are an important driver of bankruptcy filings-are reported by Miller (2011 ), Lindblad et al. (2011 ), Robertson et al. (2010 , Gross and Notowidigdo (2009), Jacoby et al. (2001) , and Domowitz and Sartain (1999) .
Other studies are more skeptical about a causal link between idiosyncratic shocks and bankruptcy filing rates. Fay et al. (2002) find no correlation between self-reported health problems and the probability of a bankruptcy filing, after controlling for debt levels. Dranove and Millenson (2006) argue that the high prevalence of self-reported medical debts does not necessarily imply that medical debts were a causal contributor to most bankruptcy filings. Hollingworth et al. (2007) compare pre-and post-operation bankruptcy filing rates after brain or spinal cord surgery and find a temporary increase in filing rates during the first two years after the operation, but no permanent increase (filing rates return to their pre-operation level after five years). Hankins et al. (2011) find no correlation between positive shocks (winning the lottery) and bankruptcy filing rates. Positive shocks tend to delay bankruptcy filings, but do not produce a permanent reduction in filing rates.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on behavioral consistency, including Barksy et al. (1997) , and Cronquist et al. (2012) . These papers have found a positive relation between an individual's risk preferences in di↵erent settings (e.g., volatile stock investments, risky entrepreneurship, and consumption of alcohol and tobacco). Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) suggest that entrepreneurs may be more risk tolerant than others, while Pollmann (2011) finds a correlation between risk preferences and occupational sorting.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature testing whether households are insured against idiosyncratic shocks. Beginning with Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994) , this literature has frequently rejected full insurance for certain types of shocks, such as long illness and involuntary job loss. Many of these papers ignore potential heterogeneity in risk preference across individuals. Two exceptions are Dynarski and Gruber (1997) and Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündelen (2005) . In work similar to ours, Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) finds that risk-tolerant individuals pick jobs with higher earnings risk and, that after accounting for this risk heterogeneity, the e↵ect of income shocks on consumption is economically and statistically small. To be sure, much of this literature focuses primarily on whether household consumption varies in response to household exposure to shocks, whereas we focus on bankruptcy. It is possible for shocks to a↵ect household consumption without a↵ecting bankruptcy filing rates (a consumer, for example, can default on credit card debt without filing for bankruptcy). This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data, hypotheses, and empirical approach. Section 3 presents our main results using our di↵erence-in-di↵erence identification approach. Section 4 concludes. Medical expenditures form a substantial fraction of the costs generated by automobile crashes. Among crashes that cause bodily injury, medical expenditures account for eightyfour percent of the average cost of the most serious crashes and about one third of the cost of minor-injury crashes. 3 These stylized facts suggest that automotive crashes can be viewed as an important shock to health status and financial well-being. 4
A potential confound arises from tort (accident) law. In Utah, and elsewhere, an atfault driver is generally obligated to compensate injuries su↵ered by the not at-fault driver.
Additionally, Utah law requires all drivers to carry liability insurance, which will be used to compensate not at-fault drivers. Although about eight percent of Utah drivers fail to purchase liability insurance (Insurance Research Council 2009), the typical not at-fault driver can expect to be at least partially compensated in the event of a crash, though there are limits to both typical liability insurance payments as well as the categories of damages that are covered. Therefore, it would not be surprising if we found no significant correlation between crash severity and bankruptcy filing rates among not at-fault drivers. We have di↵erent expectations, however, regarding at-fault drivers. These drivers bear the costs of a crash and must rely on privately purchased market insurance, public insurance programs, and self-3 A "minor-injury crash" is defined by Parry et al. (2007) as one that reduces quality-adjusted life years by less than $4,500, using data from calendar year 2000.
4 See also Doyle (2005) .
insurance to cover their costs. In the analysis below, we will distinguish between drivers generally and at-fault drivers.
Even if we observe an e↵ect of crash severity on bankruptcy filing rates, we cannot assume that the e↵ect is due entirely to medical costs. Automobile crashes result in a variety of financial costs, including property damage and work loss. Although we explore the e↵ects of these other losses in our analysis below, we are ultimately unable to isolate their importance relative to medical costs. For example, we hypothesize that the importance of property damage will vary with the age of the car. Holding bodily injury constant, damage to a relatively new car (manufactured within five years of the crash) is likely to be more costly to the driver than damage to an older car. Newer cars tend to have greater resale value and higher repair costs than older ones. Drivers also often purchase new cars with loans. Therefore, drivers with new cars may be more heavily indebted-and more financially unstable-than those with older cars.
Data
We use data on a comprehensive universe of vehicle crashes in Utah during 1992-2005. The CODES data provide a comprehensive universe of accidents in Utah during this period. A crash is excluded form our analysis under the following conditions:
1. The crash involves a driver who had another crash within the preceding three years.
This exclusion alleviates the potential confounding e↵ect of multiple crashes during the treatment period.
2. The driver died during the crash. Our data do not allow us to track bankruptcy filings by the deceased driver's family.
3. The driver's residence was outside Utah. Because these drivers will typically file for bankruptcy in their states of residence, their filings will not be included in our data.
4. The date of the crash is missing.
5. The crash represents the seventh or higher crash of a driver. We analyze the e↵ect of the first six crashes experienced by a driver. A very small fraction of drivers have more than six crashes during our study period.
In addition, we subset on drivers who were between ages 25 and 55 at the time of their crash. Drivers younger than 25 are less likely to be financially independent, and drivers over age 55 tend to have relatively low bankruptcy filing rates.
In much of the analysis below, we will compare all crashes to those in which the driver was deemed "at-fault" for the crash. We say that a driver was "at-fault" if (i) the driver was involved in a two-car crash and (ii) police records indicate that the driver was at-fault. Not at-fault drivers are identified similarly. We exclude from the fault analysis crashes in which the driver's fault is less clear, including one-car crashes and multi-car crashes. 
The Key Identification Challenge: Behavioral Consistency in Driving and Financial Decisions
Perhaps the most straightforward empirical strategy would exploit di↵erences in crash severity among observationally similar drivers. We could, for example, define a treatment group as drivers who su↵ered high-severity crashes ("high-severity drivers") and a control group as comparable drivers with low-severity crashes ("low-severity drivers"). We would then test whether the probability of a bankruptcy filing increased among high-severity drivers, relative to low-severity drivers, immediately after the crash. This strategy would be similar to the approach taken in prior studies, including Himmelstein et al. (2010) , Fay et al. (2002) ,
and Domowitz and Sartain (1999) . Table II suggests what we would find if we pursued this strategy. This table computes the average bankruptcy filing rate during the three years following a crash among (i) drivers who were admitted to an emergency room after the crash ("EDAdmit") and (ii) drivers who did not seek medical care after a crash ("Not EDAdmit"). We observe a substantial di↵erence between the two groups: Without distinguishing at-fault from not at-fault drivers, the filing rate for the EDAdmit group is over two percentage points larger-forty-five percent largerthan the rate among drivers who did not seek medical care. Restricting to at-fault drivers, the di↵erence is comparably large (a thirty-two percent di↵erence).
The comparison in Table II , however, could overstate the causal e↵ect of health shocks on bankruptcy if unobservable driver characteristics are correlated with our measure of crash severity and with the probability of a bankruptcy filing. 6 Financially unstable drivers may be more prone to su↵er severe accidents, perhaps due to unobservable characteristics that increase the risk of both financial and health shocks. Financially fragile individuals may also be risky drivers.
Table III provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that crash severity and financial conditions are jointly determined. We compute annual bankruptcy filings rate for EDAdmit and Not EDAdmit drivers during the three years before and after their crashes. We observe a substantial gap in pre-crash filing rates: bankruptcy filing rates among EDAdmit drivers are thirty to fifty percent higher than Not EDAdmit rates in every pre-crash year, regardless of whether the driver was judged to be at-fault for the crash. This is strong evidence that crash severity is correlated with the background financial characteristics of drivers, implying that a household's exposure to this kind of shock (car crash) is endogenous to the household's underlying characteristics.
6 Table II could also understate the e↵ects of health shocks because, in our data, severity is measured using data gathered at an emergency room. Financially unstable drivers may be less likely to seek medical care after an accident, perhaps because they are less likely to carry health insurance. If so, our measure of crash severity (EDAdmit in Table II ) will tend to exclude drivers who are the most financially unstable. We assess this bias in Table XV of the Appendix, which presents the insurance status of EDAdmit drivers with di↵erent injury severity levels. Even if uninsured drivers generally prefer to avoid emergency room care, their insurance status is less likely to deter them from seeking care after highly severe injuries. Thus, if Table II is biased, we should observe that uninsured drivers represent a higher proportion of high-severity injuries than of low-severity injuries. Table XV assess this claim using two di↵erent metrics of injury severity. One, in Panel A, measures severity using the total expenditure reported by the hospital. Panel A divides this expenditure into quintiles. Panel B measures severity using reports filed by police at the scene of the crash. Together these panels o↵er little evidence of a systematic tendency of uninsured drivers to avoid emergency room treatment. Panel A shows that uninsured drivers are most represented in the lowest and highest quintiles. Panel B is similar, with higher proportions of uninsured drivers at the lowest and highest severity classifications.
This finding points to behavioral consistency: In our data, drivers exhibit heterogeneous background risk levels which generate a correlation between their financial condition and driving outcomes. Additional evidence of behavioral consistency can be seen in Table   IV , which identifies several categories of risky driving behavior: reckless or at-fault driving (as determined by tra c police), driving the wrong way down a road (Wrong Way), driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DUI), driving under the influence of drugs (Drugs), speeding, and driving without a seat belt. For each category, we compute the bankruptcy filing rate during the three years prior to the crash for drivers who engaged in the risky driving behavior and for drivers who did not. In all but one category (Wrong Way), we observe higher pre-crash bankruptcy rates among drivers who engaged in risky driving. For some categories, the di↵erence is substantial. Reckless drivers, for example, exhibit pre-crash bankruptcy rates (7.43%) over seventy-five percent larger than drivers who were not cited for reckless driving (4.24%). Similarly, drivers who used drugs prior to a crash had a pre-crash filing rate (9.15%) over one hundred percent higher than those who did not (4.25%).
These di↵erences persist in regression models predicting the probability of a bankruptcy filing prior to a crash. They also persist when we compare bankruptcy filing rates more than three years prior to the crash. For example, for each crash year, we identified drivers who experienced crashes with at least one of the risk factors listed in Table IV ("risky crashes") and drivers whose crashes exhibited none of those factors ("non-risky crashes"). In unreported tables, we compute the average annual bankruptcy filing rate for the two groups during the three to six years, six to nine years, and nine to twelve years prior to the crash. During each of these lookback periods, we find that drivers in risky crashes exhibit a higher filing rate than those in non-risky crashes, though the di↵erence diminishes as we look farther into the past. During the three to six years prior to the crash, we observe an eighteen percent di↵erence in fling rates, but during the nine to twelve years before the crash we observe a ten percent di↵erence.
Empirical Strategy
The existence of behavioral consistency suggests that a driver's crash risk depends on his or her pre-existing financial condition. This presents a bias in tests that seek to discover the causal role of car accidents. To the extent that financially stressed households have higher crash risk, the bankruptcy filing rate of drivers who experience severe crashes will be higher than the rate of drivers who experience minor (or no) crashes purely for selection reasons unrelated to the crash itself.
To address this bias observed in our data, we propose a novel di↵erence-in-di↵erence (DD) strategy that exploits di↵erences in the timing of crashes experienced by observationally similar drivers. Some drivers experience crashes earlier in our data than others. Assuming the precise timing of a crash is uncorrelated with the driver's pre-crash financial condition, we can treat drivers with later crashes as a control group for drivers with earlier crashes.
In particular, we match drivers who su↵ered a crash in year t (treatment group) to drivers who su↵ered a crash of comparable severity in year t+n (control group). For each driver in the control group, we create a "placebo" crash date, equal to their actual crash date minus n years. We then compare the bankruptcy behavior of treatment and control group around year t. Specifically, we study the n years before and after year t. During this period, drivers in the treatment group experienced a crash, but drivers in the control group did not. More formally, our estimator computes the increase in bankruptcy filing rates during the period [t n, t+n) among treatment group drivers relative to control group drivers. Figure I provides an illustration of our basic identification strategy.
This di↵erence-in-di↵erence strategy allows us to estimate whether high severity crashes-which generate substantial medical expenditures among drivers who are highly unlikely to refuse medical care-cause an increase in the bankruptcy filing rate of drivers who su↵ered such crashes in period t, relative to drivers who su↵ered comparable high severity crashes later in time t + n.
By conditioning on the treatment variable, our empirical strategy allows for the possibility that exposure to car accident risk, in particular to high-severity car accident risk, is correlated with household financial characteristics. Instead, our identifying assumption is that, conditional on having a crash, a driver's pre-crash financial condition is uncorrelated with the timing of his or her crash. Put di↵erently, during period t, the same financial characteristics are shared by drivers who su↵ered crashes in period t and by drivers who su↵ered similar crashes in period t + n. This assumption is more plausible when n is small. In our estimates below, we let n equal 1 year or 3 years. We also confirm that the pre-t characteristics of treatment and control drivers are comparable regardless of whether we let n equal 1
year or 3 years.
The principal advantage of our approach is that it addresses the potential endogeneity of crash severity and underlying financial status. Financially unstable drivers may have a relatively high probability of su↵ering severe crashes and a relatively low probability of seeking medical attention. Although we cannot observe a driver's pre-crash financial characteristics, drivers who su↵er high severity (or low severity) crashes may share similar characteristics.
As long as these characteristics are time-invariant over at least short periods (say, x years), drivers who su↵er crashes in year t likely share the same financial characteristics as those who su↵er comparable crashes in year t + x.
This empirical strategy requires additional restrictions to our sample data. Although we have information on all crashes during 1992-2005, complete data on hospital-related variables is available beginning 1996. We therefore include in the Treatment Group all crashes that occurred during 1999-2002 (we stop at 2002 because we need to verify that drivers with crashes during 2002 had no additional crashes during the subsequent three years). The Control Group includes crashes that occurred during 2002-2005. 7 This allows us to observe three years of bankruptcy behavior before and after each crash. 8
Comparability of Treatment and Control Groups
Table V presents summary statistics for drivers who su↵ered crashes in year t (the treatment group) and for those who su↵ered crashes in year t+3 (the control group). Statistics that vary with time (e.g., driver and car age, whether a bankruptcy was filed in the preceding three years) are measured at time t for all drivers. Crash-specific variables (e.g., fault, EDAdmit, and insurance status) are measured at the time of the crash-t for the treatment 7 Crashes are sometimes included twice: once as a treatment crash, and again as a control crash. When this occurs, the bankruptcy filing probability is computed over di↵erent time intervals for the two observations: it is computed relative to the actual treatment date when the crash enters the Treatment Group; it is computed relative to the placebo treatment date when the crash enters the Control Group 8 We similarly construct a sample in which n = 1. The Treatment Group for that sample consists of crashes during 1997-2004, and the Control Group consists of crashes during 1998-2005. group and t + 3 for the controls. As noted above, our strategy assumes that these crashspecific variables are correlated with time-invariant, unobservable background characteristics of the drivers. This intuition is supported by Table III , which showed a strong correlation between crash severity and pre-crash bankruptcy filing rates, suggesting that unobservable characteristics are an important driver of both crashes and bankruptcies. Table V shows that treatment and control drivers are closely comparable across a broad range of observable characteristics, including driver age and gender and most crashrelated variables. There are, however, potentially important di↵erences in car age ("New Car") and between the two groups' pre-crash bankruptcy filing rates (listed under Bankruptcy Data). The di↵erence in car age is an artifact of our identification strategy: Among drivers in the control group, we take car age at the actual crash date, t + 3, and subtracting 3 to impute car age at "treatment" date t. This assumes that the driver owned the same car during the past three years. If a driver's car age at t + 3 is less than or equal to 3, we cannot impute car age at t. We could code car age as missing at t (reflecting the lack of information about car age at that date) or treat the driver as having a new car at t (thereby taking advantage of the information that the driver purchased a new car at t + 3). Because our analysis is the same regardless of the approach, Table V treats a placebo driver as having a new car at t if the driver had a new car at t + 3.
The di↵erences in pre-crash bankruptcy filing rates likely reflect immigration patterns.
When we compute the bankruptcy rate during the years preceding t, we are implicitly assuming that the drivers lived in Utah during these years and, therefore, that any bankruptcy filing would have been filed in a Utah court. If a driver did not live in Utah during this period and filed for bankruptcy in a non-Utah court, information about this filing is not included in our database. This bias is more important for drivers in the Control Group because we are measuring the bankruptcy filing rate during the three years prior to their placebo crash, which is equivalent to measuring the rate during the six years prior to their actual crash.
The immigration hypothesis is supported by Table VI, which compares drivers who su↵ered crashes in year t (treatment group) to those who su↵ered crashes in t+1. Here, there is a much smaller gap in time between the actual crash dates of treatment and control drivers.
In any event, we do not believe that immigration-induced di↵erences present a potential confound in our empirical analysis below. As reported below, our results are largely the same whether we use a control group that su↵ered crashes in t + 1 or in t + 3.
Econometric Specification
We estimate a panel probit specification of the following form:
The dependent variable (B it = 1) is a dummy equal to one if driver i files for bankruptcy during year t. We estimate this probability for each year t 2 {-3, -2, -1, 1, 2, 3} preceding and following the date of an actual crash (for the treatment group) or a placebo crash (for the control group). If a driver files for bankruptcy in year t, the driver drops out of our analysis until he or she is legally eligible to file for bankruptcy again (the law at this time prevented a driver from filing for bankruptcy during the eight years after receiving a bankruptcy discharge). 9
Crash i is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if driver i is a member of the treatment group. The variables Year t are time dummies that identify each year t 2 {-3, -2, -1, 1, 2, 3} preceding and following the actual or placebo crash. The excluded category is Year -1 , the twelve months immediately preceding the actual or placebo crash. Thus, each year dummy
Year t measures the di↵erence between (i) the average bankruptcy probability in year t and the (ii) the average in year t = 1. We define this di↵erence as the "change in bankruptcy filing rates in year t." We interact these Year t time dummies with the treatment indicator 9 We verified whether the driver obtained a discharge after filing for bankruptcy. If the driver did not receive a discharge (perhaps because the case was dismissed prior to discharge), the driver remained in our analysis because he or she was still eligible for bankruptcy relief. Our results, however, are not sensitive to how we treat this legal issue. We obtain similar results whether drivers remain in our sample or drop out after receiving a discharge.
Crash i . Each interaction is a di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimator, measuring the di↵erence between treatment and control drivers with respect to the change in bankruptcy filing rates in year t. The coe cients of interest are { 1 , 2 , 3 }, which measure the di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimators during the years immediately following the (actual or placebo) crash. Coe cients for the other interactions { -3 , -2 } identify time-varying pre-crash di↵erences between the treatment and control group drivers.
Finally, X it is a vector of driver, car, and crash characteristics, including driver age and gender, car age, and whether the driver su↵ered crashes or filed for bankruptcy prior to the actual or placebo crash. Standard errors are clustered by driver.
This specification is analogous to a discrete-time hazard model, similar to the models estimated in Grogger and Bronars (2001) and DeCicca, et al. (2002) . It is well-known that nonlinear models like the one proposed here are vulnerable to important biases. Greene (2004) catalogues some of the problems. We have verified that the results reported below are qualitatively the same when we apply a linear probability model and a conditional (fixed e↵ects) logit model.
Results

Univariate Comparisons
Figure II plots bankruptcy filing rates for treatment and control drivers during the three years before and after the crash date, which is defined as the actual crash date for treatment group drivers and the placebo crash date for control group drivers. The placebo crash date here is defined as the date three years before the actual crash date of the control group drivers. Looking across all crashes, Plot (a) shows no meaningful di↵erence between treatment and control filing rates before or after the crash date. This is unsurprising because the vast majority crashes caused minor injuries to property (fender benders). The subsequent plots, therefore, subset on crashes with relatively high severity levels and on drivers who may be more financially fragile.
Plot (b) subsets on crashes that were immediately followed by emergency room visits (EDAdmit Crashes). The pattern here is largely the same, with no apparent e↵ect of crashes on the relative filing rate of treatment group drivers. Plot (b), however, may be biased against observing an e↵ect of a crash. This is true for two reasons. First, drivers can choose whether to visit an emergency room, especially when their injuries are minor. If financially unstable drivers are less likely to seek emergency room care, the patterns in Plot (b) will be biased against finding an e↵ect. The treatment group will be weighted toward drivers who are financially stable and unlikely to file for bankruptcy in response to a shock. Additionally, many emergency room treatments are for minor injuries, such as cuts and bruises, which are unlikely to generate su ciently large medical bills that they could cause financial instability and bankruptcy.
Plot (c) addresses this issue by subsetting on crashes with two characteristics: (i) the driver subsequently visited an emergency room and (ii) the driver incurred hospital charges that ranked among the top twenty-five percent of all charges in our dataset (High Charge Crashes). The mean charge for these drivers is $12,971 (in 2012 dollars), the minimum is $1,663, and the maximum $709,875. 10 We think it is plausible to assume that virtually all drivers who su↵er injuries of such magnitude will visit an emergency room. The magnitude may also be large enough to trigger a bankruptcy filing. Among these drivers, Plot (c) in Figure 2 shows largely parallel filing rates of treatment and control drivers, before and after the treatment date, again suggesting no e↵ect of crashes on filing rates.
Because some drivers in Plot (c) had charges as low as $1,663, Plot (d) subsets on High Charge crashes in which the driver incurred at least $5,000 in hospital charges. This number was chosen because Utah law requires all drivers to carry Personal Injury Protection insurance equal to $3,000. We selected a number substantially larger than that minimum in order to isolate injuries that could destabilize financially fragile households. Here we see the di↵erence between treatment and controls widen slightly during the year before the crash and during the second year after. But the post-crash increase in the treatment groups filing rate (relative to the controls) declines in the third year, suggesting that the post-crash variation may be attributable to random variation.
Finally, Plots (e) and (f) subset on EDAdmit and High Charge crashes among uninsured drivers, who are likely more financially fragile than the average driver. There are two limitations to this analysis. First, we observe health insurance status only for drivers who visit an emergency room after a crash. Second, the sample sizes here are relatively small. Among High Charge crashes, for example, we observe only about 550 crashes and 13 bankruptcy filings on average per year involving uninsured drivers. In both plots, we observe pre-and post-crash increases of treatment group drivers, relative to controls. The post-crash increases appear in the second year, but largely disappear in the third. Together, these figures suggest that crashes may not have a sizable e↵ect on bankruptcy filing rates, regardless of crash severity. The patterns for uninsured drivers, however, are largely inconclusive due to small sample sizes. Tables VII and VIII (1) and (2) estimate the e↵ects of crashes, regardless of severity, on the probability of a bankruptcy filing. We include a minimal set of controls in Column (1): time dummies, the crash dummy, interactions between the time and crash dummies, and county and calendar year fixed e↵ects. Column (2) adds driver-specific controls, including car age, driver age and gender, and the prior bankruptcy and crash history of the driver (the coe cients for these controls are reported in the Appendix, Tables XVI and   XVII ). The coe cients of interest are the interactions "Year t After Crash ⇥ Crash" in Table VII and "Quarter t After Crash ⇥ Crash" in Table VIII . These coe cients measure the change in bankruptcy filing rate among treatment group drivers, relative to controls, during period t relative to the period immediately preceding the crash. In Column (1) of Table VII , for example, the coe cient for "Year 1 After Crash ⇥ Crash" equals 0.000025.
Baseline Estimates
This indicates that the di↵erence between treatment and controls was larger during the first quarter following the crash than during the quarter immediately before (Year -1 is the omitted category). 12 The increase, however, is very small relative to the filing rate among treatment group drivers during the year prior to the crash. This rate is given by the row "Ref. Bankruptcy Probability" and is equal to .016 in Column (1). Thus, the .000025 percentage point relative increase during the first year following the crash represents a 0.16% increase relative to the pre-crash filing rate among treatment group drivers. The e↵ect is also insignificant. (1) and (2) of Tables VII and VIII, we observe no significant increase in the relative bankruptcy filing rate of treatment group drivers during the post-crash period.
Across Columns
Many coe cients are negative and significant. These non-results are unsurprising, as noted above, because most crashes are fender-benders and therefore unlikely to impact bankruptcy filing rates. On the other hand, Columns (1) and (2) indicate that treatment and control group drivers exhibited di↵erent bankruptcy filing rates prior to the treatment date. Several of the "Quarter t Before Crash ⇥ Crash" coe cients are negative and significant (or nearly so). This raises the possibility that unobservable di↵erences between the two groups may be confounding our estimates.
The remaining columns in Tables VII and VIII subset on drivers who su↵ered sufficiently serious injuries that an e↵ect on bankruptcy filing rates is plausible. Columns (3) and (4) subset on EDAdmit drivers; Columns (6) and (7) subset on High Charge drivers.
For each group, the first column includes minimal controls; the second column adds driverspecific controls. Although an e↵ect on bankruptcy is plausible, the results here are similar to those reported in the previous columns. We observe no statistically significant, positive impact of crashes on treatment group bankruptcy rates, relative to controls, during the first three years (Table VII) Finally Columns (5) and (8) subset on EDAdmit and High Charge drivers who did not have health insurance (private or public) when they received treatment. For these drivers, high hospital charges could be financially destabilizing. Yet the results in Tables VII and VIII suggest otherwise. We continue to observe no post-crash increase in the relative filing rate of treatment group drivers. We do observe a pre-trend in in Table VIII . Treatment group drivers had a substantially higher bankruptcy filing rate, relative to the control group, during the year before the crash. We caution, however, that the sample size here is small.
Tables IX and X rerun these regressions, but subset on drivers who were at-fault.
Recall that these drivers have access to less insurance than not at-fault drivers (who can bring suit against at-fault drivers). The results are largely the same, showing no persistent or sizable di↵erence between treatment and control drivers during the quarters or years following a crash (Appendix Tables XVIII and XIX report estimates for the remaining controls). 13 Here (and below), we omit regressions that subset on uninsured drivers with High Charge crashes due to small sample sizes.
Across all specifications, then, we observe no statistically significant or persistent relationship between crashes and post-crash bankruptcy filing rates. The magnitudes of the coe cients are small and often negative. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that households are financially fragile and that unexpected shocks can induce bankruptcy filings.
Extensions
Although we find no e↵ect of severe crashes on bankruptcy filing rates, our analysis thus far may conceal important heterogeneity across drivers. Our data, for example, do not include information about income, debt burdens, and other driver characteristics correlated with financial fragility. Perhaps we would find an e↵ect of crashes on bankruptcy filing rates if we identified drivers who were particularly financially fragile. We attempt to do this in the remaining tables.
Tables XI and XII rerun our regressions on subsets of at-fault drivers who may be more or less fragile than the average driver. Throughout these tables we subset on drivers who experienced crashes that resulted in emergency room visits (EDAdmit drivers). 14 Column (1) in each table subsets on drivers whose car was relatively new at the time of the crash (purchased within the prior three years). Because many new cars are purchased with loans, these drivers may have higher debt levels and therefore be more financially fragile.
Additionally, crashes tend to cause more expensive property damage for drivers with newer cars. This means, of course, that the coe cients in Column (1) will reflect the impact of both health trauma as well as expensive property damage. Column (2) uses the same sample as Column (1), but subsets further on drivers did not carry health insurance. Across both tables, we observe no significant increase in the relative filing rate of treatment group drivers.
Although the coe cients of interest are often positive, particularly in Column (1), they are highly statistically insignificant.
Columns (3) and (4) subset on drivers between ages 35 and 45 at the treatment date (i.e., the crash date for treatment group drivers and placebo date for controls). Individuals in this age range tend to have the highest bankruptcy filing rates, due to indebtedness (for houses and cars) and family expenses. Across both columns in all tables, we observe no e↵ect of crashes on the relative bankruptcy filing rate of treatment group drivers.
Columns (5) and (6) Finally, Tables XIII and XIV rerun our regressions on the subset of at-fault drivers who experienced a crash while traveling with an underage child. We hypothesize that a driver's financial fragility may be higher when a child is a passenger. The driver is likely to be a parent of the passenger and parents tend to be financially fragile due to the expenses of childrearing. Additionally, the crash may injure the child as well as the driver. If the driver is financially responsible for the child, the child's injuries will increase the magnitude of the "shock" caused by the crash. Across all specifications, however, we observe no post-crash increase in the relative bankruptcy filing rate of treatment group drivers. Note that some specifications subset on drivers with new cars. We observe no e↵ect of crashes among these drivers. 15
Together, these results suggest that severe automobile crashes generally do not destabilize drivers.
Conclusion
We find evidence that automobile crashes are endogenous to the driver's financial condition. Severe crashes and crashes exhibiting risk factors (such as driving under the influence) are more likely to involve drivers with a relatively high pre-existing propensity to file for bankruptcy. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that adverse shocks, such as car accidents, are not exogenous shocks. Instead, we appear to observe a form of behavior consistency: there is a positive correlation between a household's probability of experiencing 15 We obtain similar results when we run our analysis on the full sample of drivers. a health shock and the household's pre-shock financial condition. Failure to account for this correlation results in an upward bias in causal estimates of the impact of adverse health shocks on bankruptcy filing rates.
We address this endogeneity by developing a di↵erence-in-di↵erence strategy that attempts to isolate unobservable background characteristics driving both accident and financial risk. We compare drivers who su↵ered comparable crashes at di↵erent points in time.
Assuming that unobservable background characteristics are persistent, we allow for the possibility that drivers who experience more severe accidents may di↵er in important ways, so long as the timing of their crash, conditional on having a crash, is unrelated to household characteristics. We view the di↵erence in crash timing as a treatment e↵ect separating a treatment group (who su↵ered a crash in year t) from a control group (who su↵ered no crash in year t, but did su↵er one in year t + 3). We emphasize that our empirical approach can be broadly applied in a variety of contexts in which selection into treatment is a concern, but in which the precise timing of the treatment is more plausibly exogenous.
Applying this strategy, we find no causal e↵ect of car accidents on bankruptcy filing rates, either economically or statistically. All of the variation in bankruptcy filing rates across individuals is explained by cross-sectional heterogeneous ex ante exposure to risk; none of the variation in bankruptcy filing rates is explained by exposure to the health shock. This result holds true even for individuals in our sample who face high levels of uninsured medical bills, although our estimates are imprecise due to small sample sizes. Our interpretation is that the households in our sample are insured in the sense of being able to avoid bankruptcy filings for the shocks investigated in our paper.
Our findings are qualified by several limitations of our research design. First, car crashes may not be informative about genuinely large financial shocks. Among drivers who visited the emergency room, the mean charge was about $10,000. While this is a substantial amount relative to both the typical household shock and median household income, more severe shocks could elevate bankruptcy filing rates. Additionally, our data are drawn from a single geographic area (Utah) with distinctive socioeconomic characteristics. We are also studying a particular, extreme response to health shocks-bankruptcy-but households may respond to these shocks in other ways, such as by reducing consumption or defaulting on debts without filing for bankruptcy. We are examining these three limitations in follow-on work studying cancer patients.
A more important limitation is that we cannot rule out reverse causation. Persistent financial distress may be a cause of risk-taking behavior, such as risky driving. To the extent that distressed households tend to be judgment-proof, they do not fully internalize the costs of their driving behavior.
Finally, we cannot rule out the importance of strategic behavior. Although we find that persistent household characteristics are more important than adverse events as determinants of consumer bankruptcy filings, 16 it remains unclear how households determine the optimal timing of filings. It is possible that households strategically time their filings to obtain the largest possible benefit, as in Fay et al. (2002) .
With these limitations in mind, we believe that our findings cast doubt on a wide range of studies arguing that shocks are driver of household distress. We are unaware of any study that addresses the potential endogeneity of shocks and household financial condition, which generates an upward bias in prior estimates. Our empirical strategy provides a new, useful way to address this endogeneity. 
Control Group
Notes. The di↵erence-in-di↵erence e↵ect is computed as the change in bankruptcy rates between [t, t + n) (the "post-treatment window") and [t n, t) (the "pre-treatment window") among drivers in the Treatment Group relative to the change in bankruptcy between [t, t + n) and [t n, t) among drivers in the Control Group. Both the Treatment and Control Groups are selected from a population experiencing a crash. For the Treatment Group, date t is the actual date of a car crash. For the Control Group, date t is n periods prior to the actual crash date, thereby excluding the date of the actual crash from the sample interval. Notes. Treatment crashes report crash, hospital, and bankruptcy statistics around the time of the actual crash for the Treatment Group. Placebo Crashes report crash and hospital information around the time of the real crash, but bankruptcy statistics around the time of an imputed placebo crash date that is three years prior to the actual crash. The full construction of Placebo and Treatment Groups is described in section 2.4. Crash data are taken from Utah police crash records. CODES data reflect hospital information that has been merged with crash information. Bankruptcy data are taken from the PACER website. Notes. Treatment crashes report crash, hospital, and bankruptcy statistics around the time of the actual crash for the Treatment Group. Placebo Crashes report crash and hospital information around the time of the real crash, but bankruptcy statistics around the time of an imputed placebo crash date that is one year prior to the actual crash. The full construction of Placebo and Treatment Groups is described in section 2.4. Crash data are taken from Utah police crash records. CODES data reflect hospital information that has been merged with crash information. Bankruptcy data are taken from the PACER website.
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TABLE VII 3 Year Sample, All Crashes
(1)-All
(2)-All (3)-EDAdmit (4)-EDAdmit (5)-EDAdmit, Uninsured (6)-High Charge (7)-High Charge (8) Notes. This table reports estimates of a probit specification using data on all crashes during the period 1999-2002. The unit of observation is a driver-year. The dependent variable is equal to one in a particular year if a driver files for bankruptcy during that year. All drivers in the sample have a "crash date." For a driver in the treatment group, the crash date is an actual crash date, occurring during 1999-2002. For a driver in the control group, the crash date is a "placebo crash" date, defined as the date three years prior to the driver's actual crash date (which occurred during [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Column (1) includes only county and calendar year dummies, a crash dummy that identifies drivers in the treatment group, time dummies indicating the years before and after the crash date, and interactions between the crash and time dummies. The excluded category is the year prior to the crash date. Column (2) adds additional controls. Columns (3) and (4) subset on drivers in EDAdmit crashes. Columns (6) and (7) subset on drivers in High Charge crashes. Columns (5) (1)-All
(2)-All (3)-EDAdmit (4)-EDAdmit (5)-EDAdmit, Uninsured (6)-High Charge (7)-High Charge (8) Notes. This table reports estimates of a probit specification using data on all crashes during the period 1997-2004. The unit of observation is a driverquarter. The dependent variable is equal to one in a particular quarter if a driver files for bankruptcy during that quarter. All drivers in the sample have a "crash date." For a driver in the treatment group, the crash date is an actual crash date, occurring during 1998-2005. For a driver in the control group, the crash date is a "placebo crash" date, defined as the date three years prior to the driver's actual crash date (which occurred during [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Column (1) includes only county and calendar year dummies, a crash dummy that identifies drivers in the treatment group, time dummies indicating the quarters before and after the crash date, and interactions between the crash and time dummies. The excluded category is the quarter prior to the crash date. Column (2) adds additional controls. Columns (3) and (4) (1)-All
(2)-All (3)-EDAdmit (4)-EDAdmit (5)-EDAdmit, Uninsured (6)-High Charge (7) 
TABLE X Year Sample Panel, At-Fault Drivers
(2)-All (3)-EDAdmit (4)-EDAdmit (5)-EDAdmit, Uninsured (6)-High Charge (7) (1)-New Car (2) (1)-All (2)-EdAdmit (3)-High Charge (4)-New Car (5)-Age 35-45 (6)-Low Income (7) (1)-All (2)-EdAdmit (3)-High Charge (4)-New Car (5)-Age 35-45 (6)-Low Income (7) (1)-All
(2)-All (3)-EDAdmit (4)-EDAdmit (5)-EDAdmit, Uninsured (6)-High Charge (7) (1)-All
